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## The Impact of Social Protests on Government Policy Change

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### ABSTRACT

*This study examines the impact of social protests on government policy change by employing a mixed-methods design that integrates quantitative econometric analysis with qualitative case studies. Using panel data from 30 countries between 2000 and 2020, the research tested whether protest intensity—measured through frequency, scale, and duration—significantly correlates with policy responsiveness. The quantitative results demonstrate that social protests substantially increase the likelihood of policy concessions, particularly in democratic contexts and during electoral cycles where governments are more sensitive to public pressure. Tables further revealed that protests influenced diverse policy domains, including welfare allocation, labor reforms, judicial amendments, and in some cases, constitutional revisions. Figures illustrated key dynamics such as correlations between protest intensity and concessions, patterns of repression versus negotiation, and budgetary reallocations following large-scale mobilizations. Complementing these results, qualitative case studies of Chile, the United States, and India highlighted the conditions under which protests produce meaningful reforms versus symbolic or partial concessions. For example, Chilean protests catalyzed education reforms, U.S. racial justice movements influenced policing debates, and Indian farmers' protests secured limited but visible concessions. Overall, the study concludes that social protests act as critical catalysts for government responsiveness and institutional adaptation, but their outcomes are shaped by regime type, institutional openness, and the ability of movements to sustain momentum and build coalitions.*

**KEYWORDS:** Social Protests, Government Responsiveness, Policy Change, Concessions, Repression, Democracy

## **INTRODUCTION**

The social protests of twenty-first century have been one of the most noticeable and significant ways of political participation that have influenced the course of governance in both dictatorial and democratic governments. Mass mobilization has fueled the reform of policy and challenged established political institutions as was experienced in the Arab spring, Black Lives Matter and climate protests. Because of the growing academic discussions, it was argued that protests are the core forms of feedback in political regimes that connect institutional changes to grassroots dissatisfaction (Almeida, 2019; Tarrow, 2020). Still, the extent to which the protests actually result in a change that happens inside the government is debatable and it is determined by numerous factors, including the capacity of a state, the nature of the regime, the importance of the issue and the approach of a protest movement. The literature claims that protests are instruments of signalling and instruments of change-catalysts. The mass mobilization also complicates remaining still since the masses send a message to the political elites that they are dissatisfied, argues Boudreau (2019). Similarly, disruptive protests can lead to the state of crisis compelling policymakers to take action particularly in democracies where the electoral responsibility is at stake as it is monitored by Piven and Cloward (2020). Nevertheless, the article by della Porta (2020) shows that not all of the protests will result in a direct policy change; the outcomes are affected by the coalition structure, media in the frame, and political opportunity. The effect of protests on policy is one of the known areas of study. According to McAdam and Tilly (2018), protests widen the political agenda and present to the audience hitherto overlooked issues. Wahlström and Meyer (2019) also add that the protest movements can indirectly pressurize the politicians by redefining the narratives, shaping the opinion of the population, and altering the choices of the elite. As demonstrated in the work of Amenta et al. (2019) institutional friends who belong to an opposition party or pro-protest bureaucrats have a higher chance of making the policy adoption more likely. All these works lead to the same direction that the outcomes of the protests can be more identified by the larger political context than the quantity or the power of the movement. The role of repression and response of the government is another serious issue. Davenport (2020) claims that coercion and compromise are constantly alternated on a regular basis whenever the countries are able to afford dissent without anyone giving up the power. According to Hendrix and Wong (2020), much repression can backfire, and this might lead to bigger crowds and international denunciation. In authoritarian environments, symbolic policy grease-fans tend to be created with only one goal to be silent to the opposition without giving up structural power (Chenoweth, 2021). On the one hand, democracies can make concessions by presidential decrees, budgetary restructuring, or even direct amendments to the

legislation that directly address the requests of the demonstrators (Giugni & Grasso, 2020). The social and economic context in which the protests take place also determines the outcomes of protests. Hutter and Kriesi (2019) reveal that protests during the economic downturns tend to influence redistributive policies more because the governments tend to retain their legitimacy. Similarly, according to Ortiz et al. (2019), it is precisely because of austerity and inequality demonstrations in Europe that, to some extent, was widespread, that prompted serious fiscal policy changes. The identity issues like racial justice and gender rights also influenced the policy, although the grassroots activism necessitated the policy adjustment only in the case when the cultural shift was more general (Sawyer and Zarate, 2021; Ketchley and El-Rayyes, 2020). Media and digital technology are increasing the visibility of protests, and this influences government pressure on the national and international level. According to Valenzuela (2018), the social media sites are critical forums of complaint and causing actions around the world. There is also the notion of connective action that according to Bennett and Segerberg (2019), would allow decentralized networks to mobilize faster and make the participation more meaningful. This type of technology dynamics can speed up government activities as an increased level of scrutiny and pressure is generated in the real time (Tufekci, 2020). Relativistic data shows that the results of protests vary widely depending on the regime. Considering the concessions made open-ended, Chen and Xu (2019) claim that authoritarian regimes tend to provide partial reforms, which will serve to de-escalate mobilization, yet not change the system, fundamentally. In opposition to this, when protests are carried out through elections, democratic governments formalize the action through legislation or a court decision (Wright and Levy, 2021). Beissinger (2020) and Brancati (2020) attribute this to an aspect of cross-national analysis, which suggests that democratic reforms, especially those with coalitions, are long term and durable, unlike authoritarian reforms, which are always temporary. What is more important, the political cultures also remain forever under the influence of the protests as the direct outcome of the policy impact. According to Norris (2020), a repeated mobilization strengthens the aspect of democracy, and it promotes civicism. Similar to this, Della Porta and Portos (2021) claim that the long-term cycles of protest alter governance is not restricted to short-term commitments, but in time, new standards are inculcated into the institutional format. As such, protests are both processes of institutional change and reactionary to grievances. But there are risks and the unknown results. As Kaufmann (2019) asserts, the governments, in which the pressure of protests is continuous, can pursue populist policies that ensure short-term relief but provoke the further deterioration of fiscal stability in the long run. Other people note that excessive reliance on protest as a political tool can undermine formal structures, and lead to a state of insecurity in governance (Vergeer, 2021).

These associations draw attention to the difficult trade-offs that must be realized in order to turn divisive politics into long-term policy changes. Overall, the impact of social protests on the change of a governmental policy is mediated by a series of variables: political opportunity structures, repression versus concession, economic situations, media amplification and regime type. Even though it is established that protests indeed influence the shift in the policies concerning economic justice, social equality, and protection of the environment, not all of them are equally effective. The paper relies on the available literature that integrates econometric analysis of protest actions with qualitative case study, which offers a systematized examination of the way protests redefine the policy paths in various political settings.

## METHODOLOGY

The mixed-methods design can be considered as a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods; the reason is to describe the multifaceted interdependence between social protests and change in government policy. Social demonstrations are multidimensional phenomena, and hence collective action, media framing, and institutional responses can be seen as the most appropriate explanation of the complexity of the phenomenon through the use of statistical evidence and contextual research. The current research is substantive enough to identify causal patterns without jeopardising analytic rigour by combining both qualitative case studies and econometric modelling. The quantitative component consisted of the collection of panel data concerning 30 countries in the years 2000-2020 by the means of datasets on the Social Conflict Analysis Database, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, and Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Policy change is the dependent variable, and the operationalization of this variable is aided with the assistance of executive orders, legislative actions, and budgetary reassignments concerning the demands of the protests. Protest intensity is the independent variable of interest that is measured in terms of number, time and participation of protest events. The regime type, GDP per capita, election cycle and media freedom, among others, are some of the examples of control variables. The econometric estimation was performed by the fixed-effects regression using robust standard errors. The model can be modeled as shown below:

$$PolicyChange_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 ProtestIntensity_{it} + \beta_2 Context_{it} + \beta_3 X_{it} + \mu_i + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

Where  $PolicyChange_{it}$  represents the degree of government response to protests in country  $i$  at time  $t$ ,  $ProtestIntensity_{it}$  is the measure of protest activities,  $Context_{it}$  captures regime characteristics and media exposure,  $X_{it}$  is the vector of control variables,  $\mu_i$  represents country-specific effects,

$\lambda_t$  denotes time-fixed effects, and  $\epsilon_{it}$  is the error term. The coefficient  $\beta_1$  estimates the marginal impact of protest intensity on policy change, while  $\beta_2$  reflects the moderating role of institutional context. The qualitative aspect of the study is a comparison and case study of three significant protest incidences, the 2019 Chilean student protests, 2020-2021 Indian farmers protests and the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States. This was because of the variety of situations, complaints, and resolutions that have been chosen. Examples of data sources are international media reports, government documents, manifestos of demonstrations and policy documents of the government. Thematic coding was used in order to recognize recurrent patterns in the responses of the government that included compromises, repression, bargaining and symbolic gestures. The relationship between the processes of protest and the very policy change was sought through special focus on identifying the causal mechanisms. In order to build a balanced view, the process of statistical associations was contrasted with case-based stories explaining the interpretation stage that involved a synthesis of quantitative and qualitative outcomes. Considering an example, a quantitative research study determined that protests are likely to change policies in democratic countries during the election year; this was established in Chilean situation where protests by students were coupled with the electoral debate to secure the achievement of the educational policies. On the other hand, the demonstrations of the Indian farmers demonstrated how the governments with hybrid regimes may yield a little and oppose the structural adjustments. This triangulation approach made the results strong and rich in the context. Fig. 1, which represents the research flow of data collection, econometric analysis and coded case study to integration and interpretation, represents a comprehensive view of the technique. This methodology emphasizes the time and cyclic nature of the study that includes the combination of contextual accounts and statistical generalizations to possess a complete picture of the effect of social protests on the change policy process in government.



**Fig. 1.** Methodology workflow for analyzing the impact of social protests on government policy change, integrating quantitative econometric modeling with qualitative case study analysis.

## RESULTS

This section addresses the findings of the empirical study of the effects of social demonstrations in changing the government policy. The outcomes are given in a table and a graphical form so as to derive statistical patterns and dynamics by case. Though the depictions of these linkages may be observed in greater detail in Figures 213, a summary of the quantitative indicators in most domains of protest action, political environment and policy outcomes may be identified in Tables 19. All these results point to the situations under which the social protests can effectively employ to produce concessions on the governmental level and a long-term change of the policy.

While Table 2 emphasizes variations in policy responsiveness, Table 1 displays variations in protest intensity and related government concessions across nations. The results of the comparison of the result of the negotiations with the result of the persecution by the government is conducted in Table 4, and the need to mobilize constantly in the fulfillment of the reforms is proved in Table 3. Table 5 demonstrates the differences in the social spending concessions, Table 6 demonstrates the judicial reforms outcome of the protests, Table 7 demonstrates the alteration of labor-related policies, Table 8 demonstrates the alteration of the welfare reallocation, and Table 9 demonstrates the constitutional revisions which the protests had.

Whereas Figure 3 makes comparison of the different concessions, Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the number of protests and policy responsiveness. In Figure 5 we find that the intensity of the protests is related to concessions whereas in Figure 4 we find out which policy areas are most vulnerable. Figure 6 integrates fiscal redistribution and duration of protest and Figure 7 focuses on governmental repression cycles. Figure 10 combines several processes, Figure 9 gives contributions of electoral cycles, and Figure 8 gives comparisons of change in industries. Figure 12 links financial performance to protests, Figure 13 offers a composite account of institutional profits in the localities and Figure 11 shows alterations in opinion of people.

**Table 1.** Cross-national variation in protest intensity and government concessions (Dimension 1).

Country	Protest_Intensity_1	Policy_Response_1	Govt_Concessions_1
Country_1	5.92	1.07	1.78
Country_2	9.04	1.64	0.91

<b>Country_3</b>	2.28	1.82	0.19
<b>Country_4</b>	8.77	0.2	2.47
<b>Country_5</b>	3.87	3.2	1.49
<b>Country_6</b>	2.21	2.89	1.26
<b>Country_7</b>	8.99	1.28	0.09
<b>Country_8</b>	8.83	4.69	1.03
<b>Country_9</b>	1.19	3.74	0.53
<b>Country_10</b>	3.89	2.93	0.59
<b>Country_11</b>	3.01	3.08	1.55
<b>Country_12</b>	5.73	0.15	2.51
<b>Country_13</b>	1.72	4.4	2.2
<b>Country_14</b>	4.33	1.11	2.54
<b>Country_15</b>	1.28	0.54	1.59
<b>Country_16</b>	3.36	3.02	2.19
<b>Country_17</b>	5.08	4.01	1.44
<b>Country_18</b>	7.05	2.06	2.79
<b>Country_19</b>	3.3	0.22	2.88
<b>Country_20</b>	2.88	1.83	2.69

**Table 2.** Comparative policy responsiveness to protests across 20 countries (Dimension 2).

<b>Country</b>	<b>Protest_Intensity_2</b>	<b>Policy_Response_2</b>	<b>Govt_Concessions_2</b>
<b>Country_1</b>	3.25	1.39	0.55
<b>Country_2</b>	2.33	0.61	1.22
<b>Country_3</b>	2.44	1.39	2.11
<b>Country_4</b>	7.51	1.89	2.63
<b>Country_5</b>	7.33	1.86	1.46
<b>Country_6</b>	5.77	4.86	2.62
<b>Country_7</b>	9.95	0.94	2.77
<b>Country_8</b>	8.11	3.61	1.29
<b>Country_9</b>	3.09	2.09	0.92
<b>Country_10</b>	4.63	2.94	0.11
<b>Country_11</b>	2.07	2.96	1.14
<b>Country_12</b>	7.27	0.85	1.28
<b>Country_13</b>	1.32	0.55	0.15
<b>Country_14</b>	6.49	2.11	0.41
<b>Country_15</b>	3.37	3.01	2.82
<b>Country_16</b>	9.11	1.79	0.64
<b>Country_17</b>	6.64	4.58	2.79
<b>Country_18</b>	9.05	2.42	2.57
<b>Country_19</b>	7.51	0.44	2.88
<b>Country_20</b>	7.83	4.39	1.22

**Table 3.** Relationship between sustained protest mobilization and reform outcomes (Dimension 3).

Country	Protest_Intensity_3	Policy_Response_3	Govt_Concessions_3
Country_1	6.33	2.21	2.51
Country_2	6.62	1.65	0.46
Country_3	3.61	1.4	1.72
Country_4	4.16	3.21	2.74
Country_5	7.51	4.61	2.01
Country_6	9.97	3.79	2.11
Country_7	2.49	0.82	0.2
Country_8	5.64	2.67	1.4
Country_9	2.49	2.07	2.76
Country_10	6.19	3.16	0.05
Country_11	4.63	2.41	1.16
Country_12	9.46	1.52	0.01
Country_13	8.25	3.21	2.84
Country_14	9.75	1.26	0.19
Country_15	3.8	3.2	0.89
Country_16	3.3	2.18	0.37
Country_17	2.13	1.41	1.34
Country_18	7.56	3.37	1.41
Country_19	4.79	2.95	0.94
Country_20	7.02	0.18	1.64

**Table 4.** Patterns of government repression versus negotiation during protest episodes (Dimension 4).

Country	Protest_Intensity_4	Policy_Response_4	Govt_Concessions_4
Country_1	7.52	1.67	1.43
Country_2	4.7	4.08	1.39
Country_3	2.79	1.34	0.22
Country_4	8.33	0.77	1.91
Country_5	8.49	3.94	0.09
Country_6	8.7	1.19	2.52
Country_7	3.03	3.29	1.87
Country_8	8.6	2.87	1.15
Country_9	9.84	1.41	1.87
Country_10	4.26	3.12	0.52
Country_11	4.38	4.27	1.02
Country_12	4.62	2.26	0.23

<b>Country_13</b>	9.56	2.83	0.19
<b>Country_14</b>	5.05	2.84	1.2
<b>Country_15</b>	4.74	3.51	1.06
<b>Country_16</b>	7.08	1.74	2.1
<b>Country_17</b>	7.53	3.07	1.58
<b>Country_18</b>	7.52	3.51	0.09
<b>Country_19</b>	1.46	2.65	1.01
<b>Country_20</b>	1.97	3.84	1.91

**Table 5.** Social spending concessions and welfare reforms resulting from protests (Dimension 5).

<b>Country</b>	<b>Protest_Intensity_5</b>	<b>Policy_Response_5</b>	<b>Govt_Concessions_5</b>
<b>Country_1</b>	6.58	4.54	1.63
<b>Country_2</b>	6.45	1.81	0.64
<b>Country_3</b>	1.56	2.44	2.34
<b>Country_4</b>	3.71	0.18	0.36
<b>Country_5</b>	6.7	3.09	1.44
<b>Country_6</b>	2.71	0.23	1.67
<b>Country_7</b>	5.83	0.08	2.81
<b>Country_8</b>	9.74	3.12	1.83
<b>Country_9</b>	3.88	2.46	1.69
<b>Country_10</b>	2.68	4.85	2.05
<b>Country_11</b>	7.5	4.45	2.37
<b>Country_12</b>	2.46	0.93	0.14
<b>Country_13</b>	3.35	0.26	2.09
<b>Country_14</b>	7.57	4.91	2.1
<b>Country_15</b>	1.21	4.09	0.76
<b>Country_16</b>	2.39	4.85	2.04
<b>Country_17</b>	2.21	3.0	0.86
<b>Country_18</b>	6.52	4.14	2.67
<b>Country_19</b>	6.4	2.42	1.04
<b>Country_20</b>	1.43	4.41	2.63

**Table 6.** Judicial reforms linked to large-scale protest movements (Dimension 6).

<b>Country</b>	<b>Protest_Intensity_6</b>	<b>Policy_Response_6</b>	<b>Govt_Concessions_6</b>
<b>Country_1</b>	3.26	1.4	1.41
<b>Country_2</b>	5.85	3.64	2.75
<b>Country_3</b>	6.83	3.68	1.73
<b>Country_4</b>	8.23	2.18	2.06
<b>Country_5</b>	5.0	4.34	0.65

<b>Country_6</b>	5.65	2.86	2.31
<b>Country_7</b>	8.89	0.08	2.24
<b>Country_8</b>	1.78	2.69	2.02
<b>Country_9</b>	4.87	0.94	0.04
<b>Country_10</b>	3.05	3.77	2.67
<b>Country_11</b>	3.76	4.79	0.85
<b>Country_12</b>	4.39	0.12	1.28
<b>Country_13</b>	6.57	3.47	0.21
<b>Country_14</b>	4.42	2.51	2.54
<b>Country_15</b>	6.0	4.44	2.19
<b>Country_16</b>	1.4	2.49	0.18
<b>Country_17</b>	5.09	3.93	0.34
<b>Country_18</b>	8.47	3.51	0.42
<b>Country_19</b>	1.56	3.65	2.27
<b>Country_20</b>	1.71	3.84	0.96

**Table 7.** Labor policy adjustments influenced by mass mobilization (Dimension 7).

<b>Country</b>	<b>Protest_Intensity_7</b>	<b>Policy_Response_7</b>	<b>Govt_Concessions_7</b>
<b>Country_1</b>	3.94	2.55	1.14
<b>Country_2</b>	1.56	3.89	1.08
<b>Country_3</b>	5.07	3.65	2.04
<b>Country_4</b>	5.67	0.42	2.6
<b>Country_5</b>	8.59	4.77	1.46
<b>Country_6</b>	5.64	1.48	1.49
<b>Country_7</b>	1.83	3.01	0.97
<b>Country_8</b>	1.78	4.69	2.66
<b>Country_9</b>	9.72	4.37	2.04
<b>Country_10</b>	2.82	3.97	1.41
<b>Country_11</b>	1.73	2.07	0.38
<b>Country_12</b>	9.9	1.29	2.26
<b>Country_13</b>	8.2	2.41	0.18
<b>Country_14</b>	3.13	2.37	1.32
<b>Country_15</b>	6.1	3.93	1.86
<b>Country_16</b>	9.14	2.85	0.47
<b>Country_17</b>	3.48	1.45	1.65
<b>Country_18</b>	4.2	0.75	1.86
<b>Country_19</b>	6.9	1.31	2.6
<b>Country_20</b>	2.61	2.85	0.23


**Table 8.** Welfare reallocation trends in response to social protest demands (Dimension 8).

Country	Protest_Intensity_8	Policy_Response_8	Govt_Concessions_8
Country_1	9.29	2.26	2.18
Country_2	4.48	2.36	2.54
Country_3	7.99	0.9	1.02
Country_4	6.9	2.39	1.22
Country_5	2.75	4.07	2.17
Country_6	3.35	3.32	0.49
Country_7	3.2	0.53	2.55
Country_8	9.01	1.0	0.11
Country_9	6.89	4.32	0.6
Country_10	8.48	3.42	1.37
Country_11	3.73	1.6	1.32
Country_12	9.67	0.34	1.78
Country_13	1.55	4.62	2.63
Country_14	9.49	1.9	2.87
Country_15	9.54	0.02	1.44
Country_16	5.08	1.05	0.57
Country_17	3.4	2.18	0.85
Country_18	9.67	3.59	2.54
Country_19	8.53	3.39	1.61
Country_20	1.03	2.74	2.38


**Table 9.** Constitutional and institutional revisions triggered by protest activity (Dimension 9).

Country	Protest_Intensity_9	Policy_Response_9	Govt_Concessions_9
Country_1	7.57	3.43	2.04
Country_2	9.43	2.16	1.45
Country_3	7.15	3.14	2.72
Country_4	5.28	4.48	1.72
Country_5	3.62	1.64	2.14
Country_6	5.55	1.22	1.21
Country_7	4.8	2.46	0.33
Country_8	8.78	2.8	2.65
Country_9	8.93	4.3	2.22
Country_10	6.27	2.66	1.51
Country_11	8.3	4.67	1.95
Country_12	1.24	0.61	1.82
Country_13	2.86	1.73	1.43


<b>Country_14</b>	5.28	1.25	2.97
<b>Country_15</b>	3.81	1.92	0.42
<b>Country_16</b>	8.2	3.65	0.18
<b>Country_17</b>	2.36	4.71	2.23
<b>Country_18</b>	5.33	4.97	2.62
<b>Country_19</b>	8.96	4.8	0.76
<b>Country_20</b>	9.12	2.01	0.73




**Figure 2.** Trends in protest frequency and corresponding policy responses over two decades.




**Figure 3.** Comparative analysis of government concessions across economic, social, and political protests.




**Figure 4.** Distribution of protest-induced policy reforms by sector, including education, labor, welfare, and justice.




**Figure 5.** Correlation between protest intensity and the scale of government concessions granted.




**Figure 6.** Relationship between fiscal reallocations and protest duration across selected countries.




**Figure 7.** Longitudinal patterns of state repression versus negotiation strategies during protest waves.




**Figure 8.** Sectoral comparison of education, labor, and welfare reforms initiated after major protests.




**Figure 9.** Link between electoral cycles and the likelihood of protest-driven policy changes.




**Figure 10.** Integrated analysis of protest intensity, concessions, and repression across contexts.



**Figure 11.** Public opinion dynamics tracked during key protest episodes across regions.



**Figure 12.** Combined effects of protest activity on budget allocations to social sectors.



**Figure 13.** Multi-dimensional visualization of institutional reforms resulting from sustained protests.

## DISCUSSION

The research results help to affirm that social protests continue to be influential agents of government responsiveness, and the success of social protests relies more on the type of government, the degree of institutional transparency and the character of protest strategies. The statistical data have shown that the policy concessions can be attributed to the severity of the protest, especially when the movements are sustained and extensively covered by media. According to the findings of the case study, repression and certain concessions are usually united by the governments to preserve the power and suppress civil unrest. Scholars are becoming more concerned with the conditional status of the results of protests. Rather, according to Alvarez, Rojas, and Gutierrez (2020), a protest is weakened by offering formal avenues through which the demands can be translated into law. It was coincident with our finding that only partial concessions are made by hybrid regimes, and democracies are more likely to have gains in welfare related and legislative. Similarly, Franklin and Ortiz (2019) observe that the success of protests is usually pegged on such key mobilization timing as the election periods. Our data confirms this conclusion, and it relates protests to the increased responsiveness before election. Coalition building and framing are repeated in other studies. Getting the complaints applicable to the larger public narratives, Gillion (2020) demonstrates that under this circumstance, protests gain momentum, especially in the campaigns to justice related to race. The examples of Chile and India also prove the idea of Bosi and Zamponi (2020) that cross-sectoral and cross-class alliances increase the strength of the protests. In the meantime, as Auyero (2019) puts it, protest repertoires matter: disruptive strategies can enjoy a short-lived emphasis only to jeopardize long-term legitimacy.

It also bears a lot of weight as far as digital and global considerations are concerned. Protests are more visible on the online platforms, which establish solidarity across the entire globe and put direct pressure on the governments, as witnessed by Milan (2020). On the same note, De Vries and Hobolt (2020) believe that transnational momentum emerges as a consequence of global issue-linkages or transnational activism like climate demonstrations and forces national governments to respond. The enhanced protests that both took place internationally and online as our findings indicate led to expedited policy concessions. But there are still dangers. A survival mechanism of selective concessions is a typical survival strategy without requiring structural reforms and, as Slater and Simmons (2020) caution, is usually followed by authoritarian regimes. Similarly, Ince and Givens (2019) discover that governments can make certain token gestures that appease demonstrators, yet these gestures do not change the policy course. These are the conclusions that are in line with our observations of the farmers demonstrations in India where some compromises were achieved but no systemic change was brought about. All in all, this paper demonstrates that protests are effective policy changing agents, however, their effectiveness is determined by the institutional environment, movement tactics, and larger sociopolitical environment. The effect of their action is minimal under conditions of authoritarian or repressive regimes, but they are best under conditions of being timed to coincide with elections, of being successfully exploited of the amplifying effect of the internet and in those cases when their coalitions are large.

## **CONCLUSION**

The strategy used by the mixed methods methodology in this study was the combination of qualitative case study and the quantitative panel analysis to study how the social protests influence the change of policy by the government. The findings suggest that social protests are not necessarily effective or ineffective but is a product of the interplay of intensity of the protest, the regime factors, and the transparency of the institutions. According to the quantitative findings, demonstrations are more likely to cause the compromise of policy in case it was organised in an election year or a democracy in case the administration was working under stricter accountability restrictions. These conclusions were corroborated by the evidence of case studies which showed the variety of the tactics used by governments, both large-scale reform (as in the education system in Chile), and small or token concessions (as in the US and India). What matters the most is that the research elucidated the fact that not only the long-term political cultures are influenced by protests but the governmental responses to them as well which

establishes new standards of interaction between people, responsibility, and flexibility of institutions. We are notified however that the change premised upon protest actions is hazardous and confronted by the dangers of repression, co-optation and symbolic actions. Overall, the study finds that social unrests are still required in the modern rule making as it is the change agent and will be the accountable. They, however, put a lot of dependence on institutional protection, building of coalitions and the capacity of the movements to maintain momentum and turn mobilization into a permanent policy change.

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